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Article
Ties to the Rest: 
Autocratic Linkages  
and Regime Survival
Oisín Tansey1, Kevin Koehler2,  
and Alexander Schmotz1
Abstract
The relationship between international linkages and the nature and survival 
of political regimes has gained increasing attention in recent years, but 
remains one that is poorly understood. In this article, we make three 
central contributions to our understanding of international linkage politics 
and autocratic regime survival. First, we introduce and develop the concept 
of “autocratic linkage,” and highlight its importance for understanding the 
international politics of autocratic survival. Second, we use event history 
analysis to demonstrate that autocratic linkage has a systematic effect on the 
duration of authoritarian regimes. Finally, we complement our quantitative 
analysis with a focused comparison of autocratic linkage politics in the 
Middle East. We show that variation in Saudi Arabian support for autocratic 
incumbents in the wake of the Arab Spring protests can be explained in 
significant part by variation in linkage relationships.
Keywords
autocratic regime survival, international linkage, Arab Spring, survival analysis
Introduction
In late January 2016, Chinese President Xi Jinping visited Iran. He was one 
of the first world leaders to do so after the international sanctions imposed on 
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Iran had been lifted. During his 2-day stay, he and Iranian President Hassan 
Rouhani signed 17 agreements, among them a commitment to raise trade 
volumes between the two countries to US$600 billion. According to Rouhani, 
they also discussed “science, modern technology, culture, tourism, [. . .] secu-
rity and defence issues” (“Iran and China Agree Closer Ties After Sanctions 
Ease,” 2016). Such diverse ties between two autocratic regimes in various 
socio-political spheres constitute what we call international autocratic link-
age. In this article, we investigate whether and how international autocratic 
linkages contribute to the survival of autocratic regimes.
The relationship between international linkages and the nature and sur-
vival of political regimes has gained increasing attention in recent years, but 
remains one that is poorly understood. International linkages are cross-border 
ties between countries across a variety of political, economic, and/or social 
dimensions, and some have argued that they can have strong democratizing 
effects by raising the international costs of repression and strengthening dem-
ocratic actors at the local level (Levitsky & Way, 2010). Others, however, 
have suggested that certain forms of international linkages can protect and 
embolden autocratic elites and reduce the political space for democratic 
openings (Cameron & Orenstein, 2012; Tolstrup, 2013; Vanderhill, 2013). 
Close ties to countries like Russia and Iran can serve to facilitate authoritar-
ian stability by shielding incumbent autocrats from democratizing pressures 
and providing lifelines of diplomatic and material support. To date, however, 
this literature has been limited by a selective focus on a limited set of interna-
tional networks and the absence of systematic empirical analysis of linkage 
politics across time and space.
In this article, we seek to enhance our understanding of international link-
age politics and autocratic regime survival in three principal ways. First, we 
focus on ties to the rest, rather than ties to the West. We introduce and develop 
the concept of “autocratic linkage”—that is, linkages between autocratic 
states—and highlight its importance for understanding the international poli-
tics of autocratic survival. We measure autocratic linkage on four dimen-
sions—trade, migration, diplomatic ties, and geographic proximity—and 
find that, in recent years, autocratic regimes have closed ranks on the interna-
tional level, a trend that does not bode well for democratic development.
Second, we test the effect of autocratic linkage on the survival of 250 auto-
cratic regimes between 1949 and 2008 using techniques of event history anal-
ysis, and demonstrate that autocratic linkage has a systematic effect on the 
duration of authoritarian regimes. In particular, we show that the higher the 
levels of autocratic linkages, the lower the risk of autocratic breakdown and 
the longer autocratic regimes are likely to survive. We argue that this is due to 
the fact that high levels of autocratic linkage give both international and 
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domestic actors a stake in the regime, and both sets of actors have incentives 
to maintain the status quo. Democratic and autocratic linkages are not equal in 
this respect, and we tease out the ways in which autocratic linkage creates 
particular incentive structures that favor authoritarian stability.
Third, we examine one important mechanism of autocratic linkage with a 
focused comparison of autocratic linkage politics in the Middle East. We 
trace Saudi Arabia’s policies toward beleaguered Arab regimes during the 
Arab Spring and demonstrate that autocratic linkage helps explain variation 
in Saudi support to regime incumbents (while also taking into account that 
this support was not always successful).
The article proceeds in five sections. First, we review existing treatments 
of linkage politics and introduce our concept of “autocratic linkage.” Second, 
we outline the ways in which autocratic linkage has implications for auto-
cratic survival. Third, we identify trends over time in patterns of both demo-
cratic and autocratic linkage of autocratic regimes and reveal a recent surge 
in autocratic linkage. Fourth, using survival analysis, we examine the rela-
tionship between autocratic linkage and autocratic survival. Finally, we test 
one particular mechanism of the effects of autocratic linkage, demonstrating 
that regimes with close linkages to Saudi Arabia were more likely to receive 
support from the kingdom during the Arab Spring.
International Politics, Autocratic Linkage, and 
Authoritarian Rule
In recent years, the international sources of authoritarian stability have been 
the subject of increased scrutiny (Bader, 2015; Escriba-Folch & Wright, 
2015; Tansey, 2016; Vanderhill, 2013). Much of this work has focused on the 
role that individual states (so-called “Black Knights”) play in sponsoring 
autocratic regimes abroad, including both authoritarian powers such as 
Russia and China as well as democracies such as the United States (Bader, 
2015; Brownlee, 2012; Burnell & Schlumberger, 2010; Levitsky & Way, 
2010, p. 41; Tolstrup, 2015). However, scholars have also focused on the 
various forms of cross-border ties that can contribute to regime survival in 
more indirect ways. The literature on diffusion has shown that the prospects 
of authoritarian breakdown depend in part on the international context within 
which a regime is situated, including regional levels of democracy and neigh-
bor regime transitions (Beissinger, 2007; Brinks & Coppedge, 2006; 
Gleditsch & Ward, 2006; Kopstein & Reilly, 2000). Yet the diffusion litera-
ture rarely examines cross-border relationships directly, focusing instead on 
the characteristics of regimes across a given region. Elsewhere, studies of 
specific inter-regime connections have focused on isolated sets of 
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relationships, such as the role of trade (Manger & Pickup, 2016; Ulfelder, 
2008), alliances (Boix, 2011; Boix & Svolik, 2013), and common member-
ship of international organizations (Pevehouse, 2005; Vachudova, 2005). The 
preponderance of empirical findings from these studies has suggested that 
international linkages can create opportunities for democratic openings and 
thus act as a threat to authoritarian stability.
Recently, Levitsky and Way have sought to consolidate much of this lit-
erature within an analytical framework emphasizing two key international-
level variables: Western leverage and linkage to the West (Levitsky & Way, 
2010). While leverage concerns the vulnerability of a particular state to 
Western pressure, linkage concerns the density of ties and cross-border flows 
between particular countries and Western states and international organiza-
tions. According to Levitsky and Way, linkage to the West acts as a transmit-
ter of international influence and contributes to democratization by 
heightening the international reverberation of non-democratic behavior, cre-
ating domestic constituencies for “democratic norm-abiding behaviour” and 
strengthening democratic opposition forces at the expense of autocratic lead-
ers (Levitsky & Way, 2010, pp. 38-54). Leverage has limited impact in the 
absence of linkage.
More recently, several scholars have identified the need to consider how 
linkages can tie regimes to foreign powers in ways that are more likely to 
reinforce rather than undermine authoritarian rule at the domestic level. 
Brownlee’s work on the long-standing ties between the United States and 
Egypt starkly highlights the ways in which linkage to Western states can help 
strengthen rather than weaken authoritarian rulers (Brownlee, 2012). 
Vanderhill places international linkages at the heart of her recent study of 
“authoritarianism promotion,” arguing that linkages to authoritarian states 
can make the external promotion of authoritarianism more effective 
(Vanderhill, 2013). Tolstrup has rightly criticized a Western bias in much of 
the literature on the international politics of regime change and identified the 
ways in which linkages to Russia have helped autocratic elites, and harmed 
democratic ones, in several Eastern European states (Tolstrup, 2013). Several 
other studies also point to the role that international linkages to major author-
itarian powers can play in bolstering autocratic incumbents (Ambrosio, 2009; 
Bader, 2015; Cameron & Orenstein, 2012).
Scholars have thus increasingly focused on the ways in which linkage poli-
tics can contribute to authoritarian stability. Yet our understanding of these 
dynamics remains incomplete, and the current literature exhibits a number of 
conceptual, theoretical, and empirical limitations. First, existing conceptions 
of cross-border linkages have either been too restricted or too ad hoc. Insights 
about cross-national ties often relate only to ties between a handful of selected 
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countries, often involving major powers such as the United States, Russia, and 
China. There is little work that explores linkage globally, and that empirically 
traces changes in global linkage over time. As a result, although we have a 
good understanding of how some forms of linkage matter for regime change 
and regime survival, we do not have a complete picture of the range of inter-
national (and often competing) linkage politics at work. Second, although 
existing work on linkage rests on some excellent case analyses, there is very 
little cross-national quantitative work that would complement the qualitative 
findings and facilitate the global analysis that is needed.
We overcome some of these limitations by conceptualizing “autocratic 
linkages” as distinct from linkage to the West or democratic linkages, and we 
systematically examine the nature and effects of autocratic linkage over time 
and throughout the world. Autocratic linkage can be conceived of in similar 
ways to linkage to the West, as the density of ties and cross-border flows 
between non-democratic regimes. Just as with linkage to the West, autocratic 
linkage is multi-dimensional and captures a range of connections between 
states, including economic and social connections and cross-border flows of 
communication and people (Levitsky & Way, 2010).
Autocratic Linkage and Regime Survival
We argue that autocratic linkages have important implications for the survival 
of authoritarian regimes because they foster preferences for status quo politics 
both among international partners and domestic constituencies. Although link-
age with both democratic and autocratic regimes abroad may at times work to 
bolster autocratic regimes, we argue that autocratic linkage has distinct and 
powerful effects that democratic linkage does not. We identify four principal 
causal mechanisms that link autocratic linkage to autocratic survival.
One channel of linkage influence works through domestic constituencies. 
Levitsky and Way argue that linkage to the West provides a range of domestic 
actors with “personal, financial and professional” ties to West, and that such 
actors will have a strong interest in avoiding international isolation and sanc-
tion from Western democracies (Levitsky & Way, 2010, p. 47). Yet autocratic 
linkage may provide correspondingly strong incentives among domestic 
actors to maintain the status quo and avoid any change of regime that would 
threaten existing foreign ties. Authoritarian leaders often secure the support 
of key constituencies, such as the military and business leaders, through 
patronage and financial largesse (Gandhi & Przeworski, 2007; Magaloni, 
2006). Where state revenues depend in significant part on international auto-
cratic linkages, any regime change could put patronage-based benefits at 
risk. New incumbents may wish to rely on the same constituencies that 
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underwrote the previous regime, but their capacity to do so is lessened if 
external partners shun them and squeeze their external revenue. Saudi aid to 
Egypt, for example, declined sharply after the election of Mohamed Morsi in 
2012, who was viewed with antipathy in Riyadh.
Autocratic linkages also influence patterns of international democracy 
enforcement. According to Levitsky and Way, during times of contentious 
politics linkage to the West increases the probability that Western states will 
both notice and take action against government abuses of power during these 
crisis moments (Levitsky & Way, 2010). Yet autocratic linkage is unlikely to 
have such effects as democracy is rarely a foreign policy goal within auto-
cratic regimes. As Donno (2013) suggests, authoritarian countries “are more 
likely to oppose enforcement, simply because they value democracy less” 
(p. 74). Consequently, countries with high levels of autocratic linkages are 
less likely to be subjected to costly sanctions that can weaken autocratic rule. 
This does not mean that countries will be free from any external democratic 
pressure, but it can ensure that democratic enforcement is not the universal 
response facing individual autocratic regimes during times of crisis. For 
example, the coup leaders who took power in Haiti in 1991 enjoyed few ties 
to autocratic states, and faced universal, UN-authorized enforcement mea-
sures that contributed to their departure from power (Legler & Tieku, 2010). 
By contrast, the Mugabe regime in Zimbabwe has a diverse set of interna-
tional linkages, and strenuous enforcement measures by Western actors were 
not matched by the regime’s autocratic partners in the region and beyond, 
many of whom actively resisted calls for international sanctions (Masunungure 
& Badza, 2010; Phimister & Raftopoulos, 2004). Channels of autocratic link-
age thus shape the intensity of democracy enforcement likely to be faced by 
norm-violating autocratic regimes.
Autocratic linkage also increases the likelihood that external actors will 
actively support autocratic incumbents. While the absence of international 
sanctions can be a welcome relief, the presence of robust external sponsor-
ship (including economic and military assistance) contributes more directly 
to autocratic regime survival (Tansey, 2016). International linkages increase 
the stakes that external actors have in the domestic regimes of other coun-
tries, but autocratic and democratic linkages are not equivalent in this respect. 
In particular, autocratic linkage heightens the fear of contagion between auto-
cratic countries, and makes it more likely partners will assist one another in 
times of crisis. Scholarship on diffusion has shown how models of regime 
contention can spread quickly from one setting to another, especially between 
densely connected countries (Bunce & Wolchik, 2011). Consequently, when 
autocratic stability is threatened in one country, its autocratic partners will 
have a strong incentive to support the imperiled incumbents and prevent 
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democratization as a means of protecting the status quo in their own coun-
tries. For example, in the wake of the color revolutions in Eastern Europe and 
Central Asia, Putin’s regime in Moscow became concerned that a wave of 
democratic transitions in the region could lead to domestic overthrow in 
Russia. The result was an increasingly assertive foreign policy, entailing 
cooperation with and support for regional autocrats as part of a counterrevo-
lutionary push (McFaul & Spector, 2009; Silitski, 2010). We explore this 
mechanism further in the final section of the article.
Finally, just as close autocratic linkages can enable fear of contagion to 
spread, so too can they facilitate processes of learning and emulation associ-
ated with diffusion. Incumbent elites with close linkages to other autocratic 
regimes will be more able to learn from, and cooperate with, foreign auto-
crats. Cross-border learning has contributed to authoritarian retrenchment in 
a number of settings, including the Arab Spring and in the wake of the fall of 
communism in Eastern Europe (Ambrosio, 2010; Heydemann & Leenders, 
2011; Koesel & Bunce, 2013). Networks of autocratic regimes have shared 
technologies designed to restrict political and civil liberties with one another, 
with less advanced countries, such as Venezuela and Belarus, learning from 
their more advanced partners, such as Russia and China (Koesel & Bunce, 
2013). Regional autocratic linkages can facilitate such processes, as auto-
cratic “first-movers” influence the policies of their regional partners. In 
Southeast Asia, for example, Singapore has acted as an exemplar for its 
neighbors in developing Internet technology without sacrificing authoritarian 
control (Kalathil & Boas, 2010).
We thus argue that international linkages are important for autocratic 
regime survival, and that autocratic linkages in particular are likely to pro-
long the duration of autocratic regimes:
Hypothesis: The higher the levels of autocratic linkages, the lower the 
risk of autocratic regime breakdown.
The Rise of Autocratic Linkage
Autocratic linkage is constituted by cross-border ties between autocratic 
regimes. To approximate the economic, social, political, and geographic fac-
ets of international autocratic linkage, we construct four indicators: autocratic 
linkage by trade, migration, diplomatic ties, and geographic proximity.
We first identify our sample of autocratic regimes using the well-known 
data set by Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2014). Each linkage indicator is 
then constructed in a manner that reflects the intensity of ties a given 
autocracy entertains with autocratic partners in a given year. More 
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precisely, for each autocratic regime in each year we sum up the volume of 
trade exchanged (in US$), the number of people migrating to and from, the 
number of diplomatic envoys sent and received, and the distance (in kilo-
meters) to all other autocracies. The resulting figures are then put in rela-
tion to the given autocracy’s GDP (trade) or population (migration, 
diplomatic ties). Analogously, we construct indicators of each autocratic 
regime’s democratic linkages.
In addition, we construct a set of alternative indicators based on average 
rather than total linkages, dividing the totals by the number of autocracies in 
the world, minus one. The two approaches allow us to examine two different 
understandings of how autocratic linkage can be compared over time. 
Particularly, total linkage levels are more easily affected by the changing 
numbers of autocratic regimes in the world during the last decades. Total 
autocratic linkage is likely to be higher if there are more autocracies to link 
to. By contrast, the variant employing the average linkage is less sensitive to 
fluctuating numbers of linkage partners and only reflects them if newly found 
or lost linkage connections are above or below average magnitude. This latter 
operationalization can be understood as capturing the degree to which poten-
tial linkages are realized. It can result in similar linkage levels based on dif-
ferent numbers of linkage partners.
Between the two operationalizations, we are confident to capture important 
variation in international linkage. We use and understand the four indicators as 
proxies to the complex and multi-faceted underlying concept of autocratic 
linkage. They represent reliable and valid measures of the most important eco-
nomic, demographic, political, and geographic dimensions of international 
linkage. They enable us to capture the intensity of linkages that each autocratic 
regime has to the rest of the world’s autocracies, taking into account their size 
and economic capacity. They are also derived from the best available sources 
of country-dyad data, which facilitates fine-grained descriptive and statistical 
analysis of linkage patterns over several decades. We collect figures on trade 
and diplomatic relations from the Correlates of War project’s respective data 
sets (Barbieri, Keshk, & Pollins, 2009; Bayer, 2006). Migration data are from 
the World Bank’s Global Bilateral Migration Database (Ozden, Parsons, 
Schiff, & Walmsley, 2011). We construct the indicators of average autocratic 
proximity from the cshapes data set (Weidmann, Kuse, & Gleditsch, 2010). 
All these data sets are organized in a yearly country-dyad format, allowing us 
to assign regime types to both countries in a dyad, and then distinguish demo-
cratic from autocratic linkages.1
Figure 1 illustrates an average autocratic regime’s linkage with both 
autocracies and democracies entertained on the four linkage dimensions 
between 1948 and 2009. To provide important context to these developments, 
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we also show the proportion of autocracies in the world during this period. 
Our indicators provide strong evidence that autocratic linkage is on the rise, 
and that this development is decoupled from the decrease in the number of 
autocratic regimes in the world. Note that while Figure 1 shows average link-
age based on the sum aggregation discussed above, a very similar picture 
reveals itself when resorting to the average aggregation (see the online appen-
dix). An average autocracy’s linkage to other autocracies by trade and 
Figure 1. Average level of autocratic and democratic linkages of autocratic regimes, 
1948-2009, on four linkage dimensions, and percentage of autocracies worldwide.
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migration has been increasing, particularly during the most recent period of 
observation, and is now higher than it has ever been. Remarkably, these 
developments take place while the number of autocratic regimes in the world 
has been decreasing since the late 1970s and, as a consequence, so has the 
average added distance to other autocracies (see the fourth and fifth panel in 
Figure 1). Note that the increase in autocratic trade can only in part be attrib-
uted to the growing economic power of China. Even if trade with China is 
excluded, inter-autocratic trade increases remarkably in the most recent 
period. In contrast, average diplomatic linkage between autocracies has 
declined sharply since the 1980s. This is due to the fact that the number of 
autocratic regimes has dwindled since then. While trade and migration link-
age can still be expanded by increasing exchanges with the remaining autoc-
racies, the number of diplomatic ties has a natural cap induced by the number 
of available partners. The sensitivity of diplomatic linkage to the number of 
available linkage partners also explains the spike during the 1980s: This was 
the high-time of authoritarianism in the world, and when many autocracies 
disappeared in the early 1990s, the number of diplomatic linkages among the 
remaining ones would naturally decrease.
The increase in autocratic linkage by trade and migration may well be the 
result of an intentional move to close ranks internationally. Particularly, the 
fact that linkage increased relative to linkage between autocracies and democ-
racies points to such an intentional shift in autocratic linkage politics. The 
exception is diplomatic linkage, which did not increase. Naturally, global 
proximity linkage is a function of decreasing number of autocratic regimes 
and cannot be attributed to any intentional maneuvers. However, we have to 
be cautious interpreting the rise in autocratic linkage as an intentional change 
in autocratic foreign policy. Alternative explanations are possible. For exam-
ple, the rise in trade linkage might also reflect general economic development 
in some heavily autocratic regions.
Although we use these indicators as proxies for our underlying concept of 
autocratic linkage, each also has a direct connection with autocratic survival. 
In the theoretical discussion above, we identified four central causal mecha-
nisms through which autocratic linkage shapes the prospects of survival, and 
each of our indicators is associated with at least one of these mechanisms.
The role of international trade illuminates the workings of our first causal 
mechanism, where important elites are incentivized to support the existing 
regime out of fear that any replacement would put external revenue at risk. 
Trade is an important source of state revenue, but trade policy is highly politi-
cal and scholars have shown that trade is particularly likely to decline after 
leadership change in autocratic regimes (McGillivray & Smith, 2004). 
Russia, for example, has offered favorable trade terms to close allies (such as 
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the Yanukovych regime in Ukraine) while making it clear that such favorable 
terms would be at risk in the event of regime change (Tolstrup, 2013). 
Consequently, the higher the levels of trade linkage between autocratic states, 
the greater the incentive that domestic elites have to maintain support for the 
existing regime and protect the status quo economic relations.
The role of migration in our story concerns the risk to autocratic elites that 
comes with the spread of anti-regime mobilization. Put simply, migration 
among autocratic regimes heightens the fear of contagion that arises when 
one regime experiences a destabilizing crisis. “Immigrant activism” is a key 
hallmark of transnational forms of mobilization and contentious politics 
(Tarrow, 2005, p. 48) and immigrant communities can act as a conduit of 
political unrest from their home country to their host country. Protests in one 
regime are thus more likely to cause concern among elites in other regimes 
where migration flows have served to bridge the gap between home and host 
country and where immigrant activists can act as potent agents of diffusion. 
Such concerns in turn increase the chances that these regimes will act to pre-
empt domestic challenges at home and stave off potential contagion from 
neighboring countries experiencing mass mobilization.
Diplomatic ties also have implications for the fear of contagion. When 
autocratic states have diplomatic relations together, they are more likely to 
gain information about the nature of, and threat from, protest events taking 
place in partner countries. The fear of contagion can thus be driven by both 
elite and non-elite forms of autocratic linkage. Diplomatic linkage also plays 
an important role in facilitating our fourth causal mechanism of elite learn-
ing. Elites can not only learn about the nature and extent of the threat from 
their diplomatic contacts, but are also more likely to learn how to suppress 
domestic challenges when they have close diplomatic connections with 
regimes with experience in suppressing public mobilization. For example, 
Syrian efforts to withstand mass public protests in 2011 were informed in part 
through learning from long-standing and close diplomatic allies in Iran, and 
regime learning in the broader region during the Arab Spring was facilitated 
by diplomatic connections in the Gulf Cooperation Council (Heydemann, 
2013; Heydemann & Leenders, 2011).
Finally, we argue that geographic proximity can also heighten the fear of 
contagion between regimes and facilitate inter-regime learning. Waves of 
regime contention often have their most significant impact on countries clos-
est to the first-movers, as actors perceive conditions to be most similar among 
neighboring states (Bunce & Wolchik, 2011). As a result, mass mobilization 
in one country is likely to pose a serious threat to neighboring autocratic 
elites, who may thus wish to offer robust support to their besieged neighbors 
and stem the tide at its source. Close neighbors are thus more likely to work 
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to preserve each other’s regimes in times of crisis and reduce the chances of 
autocratic collapse (e.g., Saudi Arabia intervened to support the regime in 
Bahrain in part due to the risk of contagion created by such close proximity). 
Geographic proximity also facilitates learning, as elites can more easily gain 
information about the strategies of control used by neighboring countries and 
employ them at home to stave off mass uprisings within their own regime. 
Just as processes of popular mobilization can diffuse more easily among 
proximate countries, so too can processes of “counterdiffusion” operate more 
easily in neighboring countries, as elites learn how to respond to threats from 
below and employ strategies of concession or repression to pre-empt success-
ful uprisings (Weyland, 2010, p. 1165).
Statistical Analysis and Results
We now test the effect of the four indicators of autocratic linkage on the sur-
vival of autocratic regimes. We employ Geddes et al.’s (2014) data on the 
survival of autocratic regimes to specify our dependent variable. Their data 
are unique in capturing the transition of one autocratic regime to another. 
Alternative measures of autocratic persistence often equate autocratic break-
down with democratization, therefore missing out on most of the variation.
We include a number of control variables that might confound an association 
between the level of autocratic linkage and the longevity of autocratic regimes. 
First, we control each indicator of autocratic linkage for the corresponding indi-
cator of democratic linkage. This ensures we do not conflate the effects of auto-
cratic linkages with the effects of international linkages in general.
Second, we control the effects of autocratic linkage by total and average 
trade, migration, and diplomatic ties for the total and average proximity to 
other autocratic regimes, respectively. Geographic linkage plays a particular 
role in our research design. While proximity can serve as a valid linkage 
indicator in its own right, it might also be a driver of trade linkage, migration, 
and diplomatic ties. However, we believe autocratic linkage is more than just 
proximity. While proximity might facilitate establishing linkages in various 
political and socio-economic dimensions, we believe that deliberate attempts 
to strengthen linkage ties transcend mere neighborhood effects. If this is true, 
effects of linkage by trade, migration, and diplomatic ties should be robust to 
the inclusion of proximity as a control variable. At the same time, proximity 
as a linkage indicator should exert a significant effect itself.
Third, we control for the effects of linkage with two predominant auto-
cratic Black Knights, China and Russia, making sure that any relationships 
we find are not the result of linkage with these two influential autocratic 
patrons. Indicators of Black Knight Linkage, analogous to our other linkage 
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indicators, give the sum or average trade, diplomatic ties, migration, or dis-
tance of a given autocratic regime to China and Russia.
Fourth, we control for the global proportion of autocratic regimes in all 
models, making sure that the effects of autocratic linkage we find are not 
simply the consequence of a more or less autocratic world.
We further control for GDP per capita and GDP growth (Bolt & van 
Zanden, 2013; retrieved from Teorell et al., 2015), both of which are likely to 
be associated with at least two of our linkage indicators, trade and migration. 
Richer and faster growing economies often trade more, and the numbers of 
both immigrants and emigrants may vary with economic performance of a 
country and its partners.
We also control for state capacity in all models, as strong states may be 
more likely to survive and may provide a fertile environment for trading 
enterprises and attract immigration. We employ the composite index of 
national capacity composed by the Correlates of War project (Singer, 1987).
We include a dummy variable marking the Cold War period in all models. 
This helps us isolate the effect of our linkage indicators from endogenous 
dynamics of the Cold War period in which autocracies were persistent and link-
ages were elaborate due to the confrontation of the Western and Eastern blocs.
In addition, we control for natural resource abundance (measured as the 
sum of oil and gas production as a proportion of GDP) and oil price (in dol-
lars per barrel) in the trade model (Ross, 2013; retrieved from Teorell et al., 
2015). Resource-rich autocracies are known to be remarkably stable (e.g., 
Karl, 1997; Ross, 2001). At the same time, oil and gas exporters naturally 
have higher trade figures. Changing oil prices can bring resource exporters 
under duress and affect trade figures of both importers and exporters of oil.
Finally, the occurrence of internal armed conflict is controlled for when 
testing the effect of migration linkage (Themner & Wallensteen, 2014).
We use the Cox proportional hazards survival model to assess the effect of 
indicators of autocratic linkage on autocratic regime survival. We test the 
crucial proportional hazards assumption and, following established best prac-
tice, adjust for non-proportional hazards by including interaction terms with 
the logarithm of survival time for problematic covariates (Box-Steffensmeier 
& Zorn, 2001; Golub, 2007, 2008).
Table 1 presents the results of six Cox models employing in turn the trade, 
migration, and diplomatic exchange indicators of autocratic linkage in the 
two variants discussed above. All models include the fourth linkage indicator, 
autocratic proximity (or rather, autocratic distance). Note that we use stan-
dardized versions of the indicators to render effect sizes commensurable. 
Note also that we do not run a model including all linkage indicators. Our 
argument concerns the effects of autocratic linkage in general, rather than the 
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relative effect of a particular variable. We understand our linkage indicators 
as proxies of a country’s overall linkage and put less emphasis on the speci-
ficities of individual linkage dimensions. (The exception here is proximity 
linkage, which is likely to be driving factor of all other linkage dimensions as 
well as a linkage indicator in its own right, and is thus entered as a control 
variable in all models.) Only if we were interested in the effects of autocratic 
trade as opposed to autocratic migration and diplomatic ties (and vice versa) 
would we need to control one for the others. In addition, inclusion of multiple 
linkage indicators is likely to result in multicollinearity, which is best avoided.
The findings lend strong support to our hypothesis. Autocratic linkage 
across all four linkage dimensions significantly reduces the risk of autocratic 
breakdown, as can be seen from the negative and significant coefficients of 
autocratic linkage by trade, migration, and diplomatic ties, and the positive 
and significant coefficients of autocratic distance. According to the first 
three models employing the sum aggregation of overall linkage, an increase 
by one standard deviation in overall inter-autocratic trade (equivalent to 
18.3% of GDP), migration (8.9% of the population), and diplomatic ties (4.6 
diplomatic ties per 1 million inhabitants), and a decrease by one standard 
deviation in the cumulative distance to autocracies (186,652 km) decreases 
the risk of autocratic breakdown by 86%, 24%, 39%, and 17%, respectively.2 
Note that effects hold when the first three linkage indicators are controlled 
for autocratic distance, indicating that these linkage dimensions are not a 
mere function of geography. The findings are also robust when controlling 
for democratic and Black Knight linkage, and the proportion of autocracies 
in the world. The effects are substantively very similar, albeit slightly 
smaller, when the average aggregation indicators are considered (the last 
three models in Table 1). Note that diplomatic linkage when aggregated via 
global averages appears to exert a time-dependent effect, represented by the 
negative and significant interaction term with survival time, and implying 
that average diplomatic linkage stabilizes autocracy only in autocratic 
regimes of a certain age. We included the time-interactive term following a 
proportional hazard violation of the covariate. The effects of all other link-
age indicators are constant over time. We subject these findings to a rigid set 
of robustness tests involving different operationalizations of the dependent 
variable, different constellations of control variables, and different time lags 
(see the online appendix). The findings of these tests provide further strong 
support for our argument.
Figure 2 illustrates and substantiates these findings. Using the results 
from the models above, we simulate the effects of our linkage indicators 
(King, Tomz, & Wittenberg, 2000; Licht, 2011). Higher values within the 
interquartile range of trade, migration, and diplomatic linkage (plotted on 
the x-axis) are associated with lower risks of autocratic regime breakdown 
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(plotted on the y-axis) relative to the risk associated with the minimum 
observed value in our data. In contrast, as the cumulative distance to autoc-
racies increases, so does the risk of regime breakdown relative to the regime 
with the smallest autocratic distance. It appears that the effects of trade and 
distance are similarly strong, while migration and diplomatic ties exert a 
somewhat weaker effect. Note that the inner 95% of 1,000 simulations 
(illustrated by the gray shaded area and analogous to a 95% confidence 
interval) exclude a hazard ratio of 1, implying that the effects are substan-
tively significant at (at least) the 5% level.
The combination of our four measures of autocratic linkage as well as a 
series of time lags we employ (Table 2) safeguards our findings against endo-
geneity. Regarding the trade and diplomacy linkage indicators, the causal 
arrow could well point in the other direction. Autocratic regimes that have 
been around for longer have had more time to establish trade and diplomatic 
relations with other autocracies. In other words, autocratic durability could 
cause higher autocratic linkage, rather than the other way around. If this were 
the case, we would wrongly take causes for effects. However, while endoge-
neity could be a problem with regard to trade and diplomatic linkage, an 
inverse causal relationship between autocratic persistence and migration is 
Figure 2. Simulated Effects of Autocratic Linkage Indicators on Autocratic Regime 
Breakdown.
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Table 2. Coefficients of the Effect of Lagged Autocratic Linkage Indicators on 
Autocratic Regime Breakdown.
Trade 
(sum)
Migration 
(sum)
Diplomatic 
(sum)
Trade 
(mean)
Migration 
(mean)
Diplomatic 
(mean)
No time lags
 Autocratic 
linkage
−1.846*** −0.358** −0.707*** −1.846*** −0.358** −0.707***
(0.699) (0.160) (0.238) (0.699) (0.160) (0.238)
 Autocratic 
distance
0.253*** 0.286*** 0.257*** 0.253*** 0.286*** 0.257***
(0.094) (0.102) (0.099) (0.094) (0.102) (0.099)
Two-year lags
 Autocratic 
linkage
−1.285*** −0.255** −0.295 −1.285*** −0.255** −0.295
(0.455) (0.123) (0.214) (0.455) (0.123) (0.214)
 Autocratic 
distance
0.178* 0.199** 0.184* 0.178* 0.199** 0.184*
(0.100) (0.100) (0.100) (0.100) (0.100) (0.100)
Three-year lags
 Autocratic 
linkage
−1.330*** −0.311** −0.187 −1.330*** −0.311** −0.187
(0.481) (0.136) (0.193) (0.481) (0.136) (0.193)
 Autocratic 
distance
0.142 0.181* 0.179* 0.142 0.181* 0.179*
(0.089) (0.096) (0.093) (0.089) (0.096) (0.093)
Four-year lags
 Autocratic 
linkage
−1.236*** −0.285** 0.288 −1.236*** −0.285** 0.288
(0.466) (0.139) (0.266) (0.466) (0.139) (0.266)
 Autocratic 
distance
0.168** 0.204** 0.187** 0.168** 0.204** 0.187**
(0.079) (0.091) (0.086) (0.079) (0.091) (0.086)
Five-year lags
  Autocratic 
linkage
−0.662 −0.293** −0.119 −0.662 −0.293** −0.119
(0.410) (0.132) (0.186) (0.410) (0.132) (0.186)
 Autocratic 
distance
0.146* 0.184** 0.193** 0.146* 0.184** 0.193**
(0.088) (0.088) (0.088) (0.088) (0.088) (0.088)
Entries are Cox regression coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses from models using 
different time lags. Linkage indicators standardized. Control variables (same as in Table 1) not shown: GDP, 
growth, state capacity, Cold War resources, oil price, conflict.
*p < .1. **p < .05. ***p < .01.
hardly plausible, and outright impossible with regard to proximity. We do not 
have reason to expect that in longer lasting autocracies, people tend to migrate 
more to other autocracies than anywhere else. And of course, autocracies do 
not move geographically closer to one another the longer they exist. As a 
further precaution against endogeneity, we show our findings when employ-
ing different time lags of the covariates (Table 2). Most of the effects we 
found maintain up until a 4-year time lag, with the exception of both indica-
tors of diplomatic linkage, which are negative throughout, indicating an 
autocracy sustaining effect, but only significant in the model without lags, 
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and the 1-year lag-model presented in Table 1. Finally, lagged by 5 years, 
trade linkage also loses significance.
The effect of democratic linkage is ambiguous at best. It is insignificant 
in most models in Table 1, and has a positive effect only in the first and a 
time-dependent effect in the third model. This ambiguity matches mixed 
accounts in the literature: While sometimes democratic influence from 
abroad is said to undermine autocratic regimes, democracies have also been 
shown to support autocratic regimes if it serves their purposes (Brownlee, 
2012; Cox, Ikenberry, & Inoguchi, 2000; Schmitz, 2006). The interesting 
(non-)finding would deserve more attention. However, a more detailed dis-
cussion is beyond the scope of this article and must be pursued in future 
research.
Similarly, the supportive effect of Black Knight linkage pointed out in the 
literature on the influence of China and Russia does not seem to hold when 
contrasting it against global autocratic linkages. In most models, the coeffi-
cient is negative but insignificant. In the two trade models, it is significantly 
positive, indicating in stark contrast to the literature that Black Knight link-
age might undermine rather than fortify autocratic regimes.
Finally, we can confirm that a more autocratic global climate, captured 
here by the proportion of global autocracies, significantly reduces the likeli-
hood of autocratic regime breakdown. However, this effect seems to wear off 
in older autocracies, judging from the significantly positive, albeit smaller, 
time-interactive effect found in all models. Importantly, however, the propor-
tion of autocracies in the world does not inhibit the effects of autocratic link-
age. Autocratic linkage supports autocratic rule, regardless of how many 
autocracies there are.
Autocratic Linkages in the Arab Spring: The Saudi 
Counterrevolution
Having demonstrated that autocratic linkages contribute to the stability of 
authoritarian regimes, we now submit our theory to a different type of test by 
turning to the events of the Arab Spring. The Arab Spring presents an ideal 
test case for our theory: While six Arab countries saw regime-threatening 
instability in early 2011, only three experienced regime breakdown as a result 
of popular uprisings.3 Following the literature (Brownlee, Masoud, & 
Reynolds, 2015), we treat Libya as a case of non-breakdown because Gadhafi 
lost power in the context of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)-led 
external intervention, not as a result of the mass uprising proper. Based on our 
findings, we would expect cases of non-breakdown to exhibit a significantly 
higher density of autocratic linkages. Moreover, at a lower level of analysis, 
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we should also be able to observe how dense linkages are translated into 
concrete measures of support.
On the aggregate level, to begin with, the connection between high linkage 
levels and regime durability we observed above is also visible in the Arab 
Spring. As Table 3 shows, the cases of non-breakdown (Bahrain, Libya, and 
Syria) show higher linkage levels on three of the four measures (trade, migra-
tion, and distance) when compared with all other countries. Moreover, all of our 
linkage indicators with the exception of distance suggest a higher level of auto-
cratic linkages for the non-breakdown group than for the group of countries that 
experienced breakdown as a result of mass protests (Egypt, Tunisia, and Yemen). 
Moving to individual countries, our measures are strong predictors of regime 
trajectories in the Arab Spring as well. Based on linkage density alone, we 
would have failed to correctly predict the outcome only in the Syrian case, 
Table 3. Linkage Density and Regime Outcomes in the Arab Spring.
Breakdown Non-breakdown
 Egypt Tunisia Yemen Bahrain Libya Syria All
Trade (% of GDP)
 All −0.18* −0.15* −0.10 1.20*** 0.11 −0.15* 0.14**
 AS −0.35** −0.32** −0.26* 1.27*** −0.01 −0.32** 0.52***
Migration (per thousand)
 All −0.77*** −0.98*** −0.51** 1.93*** 0.21 −0.81*** 0.76***
 AS −0.62 −0.83* −0.36 2.08** 0.37 −0.65 0.60
Diplomatic (per million)
 All −0.024 0.008 −0.017 0.284*** 0.068*** −0.014 0.014
 AS −0.087* −0.057 −0.079* 0.277*** 0.022 −0.076* 0.124***
Distance (km)
 All −1,541*** −443 −1,296** −861** −1,486** −1,123** −1,131***
 AS −491*** 805*** −202* 312** −426*** 3 62
The rows labeled “AS” use the Arab Spring countries as a comparison group, while the 
columns labeled “all” use all countries; in both cases, averages for the 2000s are compared in 
one-tailed t tests. All cell entries are differences in means; shaded cells contain differences in 
line with our expectations.
*p < .1. **p < .01. ***p < .001.
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where relatively low linkage density would have suggested a higher likelihood 
of regime breakdown. In the remaining five cases, our linkage indicators point 
in the direction suggested by our theory with only minor exceptions. Merely the 
distance component does not perform well, a fact that can be explained with the 
above-average concentration of autocratic regimes in the Middle East.
Instead of concluding that our argument is supported by the Arab Spring 
and stopping the analysis here, we follow suggestions in the methodological 
literature and test implications of our theory beyond the original set of 
hypotheses discussed above (King, Keohane, & Verba, 1994). In particular, 
exploiting the strengths of small-N case studies, we use evidence from the 
Arab Spring to examine one of our four causal mechanisms in detail, and 
explore the ways in which autocratic linkage increases the likelihood that an 
authoritarian regime will receive external support in times of crisis. As 
Lieberman observes, this strategy “requires a shifting of levels of analysis” 
turning from the aggregate level to “an examination of within-case pro-
cesses” (Lieberman, 2005, p. 440; emphasis in original).
We thus start from the observation that, in accordance with our theory, 
countries with denser autocratic linkages were less likely to experience 
regime breakdown in the Arab Spring. In a further step, we examine one way 
in which dense autocratic linkages are connected to regime survival: via sup-
portive action by international allies. To observe this causal mechanism, we 
focus on the actions of a single external actor. As has been observed, Saudi 
Arabia “positioned itself as the chief architect of a counterrevolution to con-
tain, and perhaps even to reverse, the Arab Spring as much as possible” 
(Kamrava, 2012, p. 96). The Saudi regime mobilized its considerable diplo-
matic, financial, and even military resources to support some of the region’s 
autocrats in times of crisis (al-Rasheed, 2011; Kamrava, 2012; Rieger, 2014). 
Yet, Saudi policy toward the Arab Spring was not as uniform as is sometimes 
implied by proponents of the counterrevolution narrative: Only in three cases 
out of six—namely, in Bahrain, Egypt, and Yemen—did the Kingdom actu-
ally intervene on the side of the incumbent regime. In the three other cases—
in Libya, Syria, and Tunisia—Saudi policy ranged from benign disinterest 
(Tunisia), to support for international military action against the regime 
(Libya), and active support of the armed opposition (Syria). In brief, Saudi 
policy toward the Arab Spring was not driven by a mere reflex in favor of the 
status quo, but varied across different cases. If our causal mechanism is well 
specified, we would expect Saudi Arabia to act in support of embattled auto-
crats in cases of dense linkages, but remain silent or even voice support for 
the opposition in cases of low linkages.
International support in times of regime crisis does not perfectly predict 
autocratic survival and the Saudi counterrevolution in the Arab Spring is no 
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exception in this regard. In Egypt and Yemen, to begin with, autocrats even-
tually fell despite Saudi support although in both cases Saudi Arabia contin-
ued to influence post-breakdown dynamics. In Syria, however, Bashar 
al-Assad survived in office despite Saudi opposition. In this section, we aim 
to show that autocratic linkage density increases the likelihood that an embat-
tled incumbent will receive support from international autocratic allies. We 
are not claiming, however, that international support is always effective, 
much less that autocratic linkage can explain regime outcomes in the Arab 
Spring more generally. As the comparative literature on regime outcomes in 
the Arab Spring has demonstrated, regime trajectories in the Arab Spring 
were significantly shaped by domestic factors, notably the behavior of the 
coercive apparatus (Bellin, 2012; Brownlee et al., 2015). We do not purport 
to offer an alternative explanation for regime trajectories in the Arab Spring, 
but merely to illustrate how—all other things equal—autocratic linkage con-
tributes to authoritarian stability by inducing international allies to lend sup-
port to their embattled allies.
Saudi Responses to the Arab Uprisings
One advantage of focusing on crisis periods is that our theory makes clear 
predictions on the expected behavior of international actors. In a nutshell, 
when authoritarian regimes are confronted with an immediate challenge to 
their stability, we would expect external autocratic allies to intervene in sup-
port in cases of high linkage density, but not in cases in which linkages are 
weak. External autocratic sponsorship can take a variety of forms, and here 
we focus on two broad categories of support (Tansey, 2016). First, external 
actors can seek to divert potential pressure against embattled regimes origi-
nating from other international actors, for example, by blocking international 
sanctions. Second, supportive actions by international autocratic allies can 
also include direct material or political interventions at the domestic level, 
including financial assistance or the supply of weapons. The Saudi reaction 
to the Arab Spring comprised both types of external support to autocratic 
regimes under stress. We first outline these reactions and then turn to the role 
of linkages in explaining variance in Saudi behavior.
Diluting external pressure. The repression of domestic uprisings often creates 
punitive international costs, as external actors seek to sanction and isolate the 
regime. Yet autocratic allies can support beleaguered autocratic incumbents 
by blocking attempts at international condemnation or sanctions. Saudi Ara-
bia’s actions in support of the Mubarak regime in Egypt provide an important 
example. The late King Abdallah was an open critic of the public protests in 
Tansey et al. 1243
Egypt and notified U.S. President Obama by phone that Saudi Arabia would 
substitute for U.S. aid to Egypt if the United States were to withdraw their 
assistance (“Al-Malik Abdallah talaba Obama bi-l-imtina’ ‘an idhlal 
Mubarak,” 2011). This was a clear signal to the United States that contem-
plating economic sanctions against Egypt by withholding U.S. assistance 
would be pointless as Saudi Arabia would cover the bill. Even as late as Feb-
ruary 8, 2011, three days before Mubarak’s forced resignation, Saudi Arabia 
joined the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Israel among other Middle East-
ern allies of the United States in lobbying the White House not to put too 
much pressure on Mubarak (“Allies Press U.S. to Go Slow on Egypt,” 2011).
Saudi Arabia used the same strategy in support of the new military rulers in 
Egypt after the military coup of July 3, 2013, again offering to compensate 
Egypt for potential losses in American aid in the context of the military’s 
crackdown on the Muslim Brotherhood (MB). Riyadh also offered vocal dip-
lomatic support in ways that clearly signaled the strength of the new regime’s 
international alliances. Following the July 3, 2013 return of the Egyptian mili-
tary to political power, the Saudi announced that “the people and government 
of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia stood and still stand today with our brothers 
in Egypt against terrorism, extremism and sedition, and against whomever is 
trying to interfere in Egypt’s internal affairs” (cited in Rieger, 2014, p. 11). 
Quite predictably, the Saudi, Emirati and Kuwaiti authorities were the first to 
congratulate Adly Mansour who became interim president after Morsi’s depo-
sition and expressed strong support for the Egyptian military (Rieger, 2014).
By contrast, the Saudis never used comparable language to describe the 
protests in Tunisia. They merely affirmed their support for the “brotherly 
people of Tunisia,” simultaneously making it known that Ben Ali was not to 
engage in political activities while a guest in Saudi Arabia (“Khashoggi,” 
2011). In the case of Libya, moreover, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) 
referred to the Libyan regime as “illegitimate” and spoke of the demands of 
the Libyan people early on in the crisis. Published in the wake of a meeting 
of GCC foreign ministers in Riyadh on March 10, 2011 (and thus 4 days prior 
to GCC intervention in Bahrain), the statement denounced the use of violence 
against civilians and called on the Arab League and the United Nations to 
impose a no-fly zone (“Al-nas al-kamil li-l-bayan al-sadir ‘an ijtima’ wuzara’ 
kharijiya duwal majlis al-ta’aun al-khaliji,” 2011). In brief, Saudi public pro-
nouncements on the uprisings in the Arab Spring clearly followed a differen-
tiated policy, designed to divert pressure from and generate international 
support for specific regimes and to foster opposition against others.
Direct support for domestic incumbents. As well as seeking to minimize interna-
tional costs and maximize international support, external autocratic allies can 
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also seek to bolster autocratic incumbents through direct assistance at the 
domestic level. By directly intervening in support of an authoritarian incum-
bent (through surges in financial aid, arms transfers, or even direct military 
intervention), autocratic allies cover parts of the direct, material costs of the 
conflict and enhance the regime’s room to maneuver. Saudi intervention in 
Bahrain under the cover of the Peninsula Shield Force (quwwat dir‘ al-jazira 
al-mushtarika) maintained by the GCC offers a clear example of such material 
support. Officially acting on the request of the Bahraini government, observers 
have suggested that the initiative actually came from the Saudi regime itself, 
which felt threatened by the potential cross-border implications of political 
change in Bahrain (also see Odinius & Kuntz, 2015; Rieger, 2014). Part of the 
reason for this threat perception was the fact that Saudi Arabia was concerned 
about the effects of the Bahraini uprising on its own restive Shia minority in the 
Eastern Province (Wehrey, 2013). Given the tight interconnections between 
Bahrain and Saudi Arabia, the Saudi regime had an interest in containing the 
situation in Bahrain. While Saudi troops were not directly involved in repres-
sive activity, they nevertheless freed up Bahraini capabilities that could then be 
deployed against the protesters. In brief, by sending troops to Bahrain, Saudi 
Arabia took over parts of the direct costs of repressing the Bahraini uprising.
GCC stabilization efforts in Bahrain also included financial aid. In March 
2011, the GCC foreign ministers set up a US$20 billion fund for Bahrain and 
Oman with the aim of bolstering these two poorer member states’ capacity to 
counteract economically motivated domestic dissent. Bahrain used these 
resources in part to create 20,000 new jobs in the Ministry of Interior, no 
small feat in a country of 600,000 inhabitants (Hertog, 2011).
Financial aid was also an important instrument in Saudi policy toward the 
post-revolutionary Egyptian regime. The Saudis supported the return to 
power of Egypt’s military elite by first starving the post-Mubarak MB-led 
regime of financial aid, and then massively increasing aid flows immediately 
after the July 2013 military takeover. Although Saudi Arabia had pledged 
support to Egypt in the form of a US$4 billion loan in May 2011, the actual 
disbursement of this loan was delayed. Similarly, in October 2011, the UAE 
had pledged US$3 billion in aid to Egypt, but then failed to disburse the 
amount until July 2013, arguing that the mechanisms of delivery had not yet 
been decided upon (Farouk, 2014). The flow of GCC (with the exception of 
Qatari) money into Egypt only resumed following the July 3 military take-
over. On July 9 and 10, 2013, about a week after the coup, Saudi Arabia, the 
UAE, and Kuwait each announced aid packages to Egypt with a total volume 
of US$12 billion. By January 2014, the Central Bank of Egypt declared that 
it had already received US$9 billion and even returned a US$2 billion deposit 
made earlier by Qatar (Farouk, 2014).
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In Yemen, finally, Saudi influence was equally consequential. Saudi Arabia 
had long cultivated networks of supporters among the Yemeni tribes. While 
systematic figures are not available, in the year 2000, Saudi Arabia’s Special 
Committee for Yemeni Affairs (SCYA) through which Saudi influence was 
channeled had a budget of US$3.5 billion and estimates on the number of 
Yemeni political actors on the Saudi payroll before the 2011 uprising go into 
the thousands (Burke, 2013; Phillips, 2011). In 2008, the Kingdom confirmed 
that it had paid a monthly stipend of US$800,000 to the paramount shaykh of 
the Hashid tribal confederation (the most important tribal group in the country 
to which President Salih belonged) and that it would continue to pay the same 
amount to the shaykh’s sons after his death (Phillips, 2011, Chapters 3 and 4; 
U.S. Diplomatic Cable, 2009). In the context of the uprising in Yemen, Saudi 
Arabia used these connections to create domestic support for its transition plan 
(later known as the GCC initiative) that included not only President Salih’s 
resignation but also “ensure[d] roles for as many members of the Saleh regime 
as possible” (Horton, 2011). In particular, the GCC initiative made sure to 
exclude the Houthi-movement, Saudi Arabia’s most vocal internal critic, from 
the transitional process—a decision that significantly contributed to the failure 
of conflict resolution in Yemen and also explains Saudi Arabia’s armed inter-
vention in the Yemeni crisis since early 2015.
Linkage Intensity and Saudi Support
How well do these different forms of support align with the density of link-
ages between Saudi Arabia and the countries hit by uprisings during the Arab 
Spring? On the aggregate level, to begin with, the evidence supports our 
hypothesis: Employing the operationalization of autocratic linkages in terms 
of trade volumes, migration flows, and diplomatic ties we introduced above, 
the three countries that received some kind of support from the Saudi regime 
during their respective crises (Bahrain, Egypt, and Yemen) show significantly 
higher levels of linkage density than the three countries that did not (Libya, 
Syria, and Tunisia).
As Table 4 shows, those countries that were supported by Saudi Arabia in 
the Arab Spring traded significantly more with the kingdom than those that 
were not, they contributed more to the immigrant population in Saudi Arabia,4 
they universally had full diplomatic relations at all times between 1990 and 
2005, and the distance between their capitals and Riyadh is significantly 
smaller. In brief, our four different linkage indicators align well with Saudi 
policies toward the Arab uprisings on the aggregate level.
If we break this information down to the country level, the picture becomes 
less clear-cut, but still offers considerable support for our arguments. Table 5 
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displays the strength of linkages with Saudi Arabia for all six Arab Spring 
countries. There are two cases with weak linkages to Saudi Arabia (Libya and 
Tunisia), and four cases with relatively high linkage density (Bahrain, Egypt, 
Syria, and Yemen).
Bahrain, the country that arguably saw the most intense form of Saudi 
intervention during the Arab Spring also has the highest level of linkage den-
sity. In the Bahraini case, this is mainly a function of the extraordinarily 
dense trade relations between the two Gulf countries: As displayed in Table 
5, the trade volume with Saudi Arabia accounted for more than 40% of 
Bahraini GDP during the 2000s, a fact that can in no small measure be 
explained by Bahraini dependence on Saudi oil. Egypt and Yemen, in turn, 
show lower, but still considerable levels of linkage density with Saudi Arabia 
Table 5. Linkage Density between KSA and Arab Spring Countries.
Trade volume as 
% of GDP Migrants in 
KSA as % of 
population
Diplomatic 
relations with 
KSA (2000s)
Distance 
(in km)
Linkage 
strength Receiver KSA
Bahrain 42.42 0.86 0.04 Full 428 Strong
Egypt 0.56 0.68 1.39 Full 1,636 Strong
Libya 0.21 0.02 0.01 Interrupted 3,375 Weak
Syria 0.85 0.58 0.65 Full 1,406 Strong
Tunisia 0.20 0.05 0.10 Full 3,714 Weak
Yemen 0.81 0.22 1.99 Full 1,072 Strong
The trade data are averages for 2000 to 2009, the migration data are for 2000, and the 
diplomatic relations data are for the 2000s. Diplomatic relations are interrupted if ambassadors 
have been withdrawn at any point during the 2000s. KSA = Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.
Table 4. Linkage Density with KSA and Saudi Reactions to the Arab Spring.
Trade Migration
Full diplomatic 
relations (N)
Distance 
(in km) 
Million 
U.S. dollar
% of GDP 
(receiver)
% of GDP 
(KSA) Absolute
% of sender 
population
Support 1,280 11.16 0.59 358,448 1.03 3 1,135
No support 71 0.21 0.03 4,786 0.05 2 3,545
Difference −1,209a −10.95a −0.55a −353,662 −0.98 1 2,409a
Values for trade and migration are averages for the 2000s; diplomatic relations captures whether full 
diplomatic relations were ever interrupted between 1990 and 2005, and distance is the distance between 
Riyadh and the respective capital of the Arab Spring state in kilometers. KSA = Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.
a. Difference in means significant in a t test at 95% confidence level.
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in terms of trade volumes and migration flows, and Saudi Arabia’s reaction 
aligns with linkage patterns in the expected way.
The same can be said for Libya and Tunisia. As Table 5 reports, trade link-
ages and migration movements between Saudi Arabia and both Libya and 
Tunisia were weak. In addition, Libya did not maintain uninterrupted diplo-
matic relations with Saudi Arabia throughout the 2000s. In accordance with 
our expectations, Saudi Arabia did not offer any support to these two coun-
tries during the Arab Spring. While linkages between Saudi Arabia and Libya 
were negligible, the Kingdom’s opposition against Qadhafi was probably 
also influenced by his erratic nature and the ongoing, personal row between 
the Libyan leader and the Saudi King.5 In Tunisia, the Saudis applied a cau-
tious and largely indifferent strategy. While they continued to back Egypt’s 
Husni Mubarak at about the same time, they did not come out in support of 
Tunisian President Zine al-Abidin Ben Ali. Although Ben Ali was granted 
exile in Saudi Arabia, he was not allowed to engage in political activities 
while in Saudi Arabia (“No Saudi Mediation for Bin Ali,” 2011).
The only case that does not conform to our expectations is Syria. As 
reported in Table 5, Syria actually enjoyed relatively strong linkages with 
Saudi Arabia both in terms of trade and migration flows. As all other Arab 
Spring countries with the exception of Libya, Syria also enjoyed full diplo-
matic relations with the Saudi monarchy throughout the 2000s. At the same 
time, however, Saudi policy in the Syrian crisis has not only been non-sup-
portive, but actually outright hostile toward the Syrian regime. While this 
aspect of Saudi policy toward the Arab Spring is probably driven by regional 
strategic considerations—such as Syria’s alignment with Iran and Hizballah—
it nevertheless goes against our expectations.
This points to a major limitation of probabilistic arguments. While linkage 
density—as measured by trade, migration, diplomatic ties, and proximity—
provides a strong explanation on average, linkage patterns cannot account for 
all observable variation. Neither do our linkage measures capture all the 
nuances of international and regional alliances, nor does linkage completely 
determine the foreign policy of autocratic states. The fact that Syria is an 
outlier both when compared with all other autocracies globally (Table 3), and 
when compared with the other Arab Spring countries (Table 5), is illustrative 
of this limitation. On average, however, our measures represent a valid 
approximation of linkage density and we find strong support for the stabiliz-
ing effect of autocratic linkage. This claim is supported by our statistical 
results and the remaining five Arab Spring cases with the exception of Syria.
Moreover, we find no plausible alternative explanation that can account for 
the pattern of Saudi support. The principal alternative explanations would focus 
on Saudi national interests, variously defined in terms of the containment of Iran 
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as a major Shia power, the protection of fellow monarchies in the region, or the 
stabilization of their immediate neighborhood (see Ennis & Momani, 2013). 
None of these arguments provide a better alternative to linkage patterns. 
Confessionalism and the containment of Iran, to begin with, could be adduced 
as an explanation for Saudi intervention in support of the Sunni-led minority 
regime in Bahrain, but hardly provide a convincing explanation for Saudi sup-
port to Egypt (but not Sunni Tunisia) or the fact that the kingdom traditionally 
maintained ties of patronage to Zaydi Shia tribal elites in Yemen. Monarchical 
regime type or proximity do not fare much better as alternative explanations. 
Saudi Arabia gave support to both monarchies and republics in the Arab Spring. 
Proximity as an isolated factor might explain the kingdom’s support for the 
regime in neighboring Bahrain and Saudi indifference toward the events in far-
away Tunisia, but proximity alone does not explain variation in Saudi reactions 
among the group of countries that share similar distances to Saudi Arabia, nor 
can proximity account for Saudi hostility toward distant Libya.
In sum, we find ample empirical evidence to back up the plausibility of our 
hypothesized causal mechanism linking autocratic linkage to external support 
in times of crisis. Our argument is not that autocratic linkages are completely 
independent of strategic considerations, but rather that once created, they can 
have independent effects. Linkages create vested interests on both sides and, 
once in place, generate path dependencies that shape the likelihood of specific 
foreign policy choices. As the Syrian outlier suggests, high linkage density 
operates more as a necessary, rather than sufficient, condition for external sup-
port. Nonetheless, the pattern of Saudi policy across the Arab Spring cases 
points to a compelling and important role for autocratic linkage in shaping a 
key mechanism in our causal story, namely, the role of external support for 
beleaguered autocratic incumbents in times of contentious politics.
Conclusion
In recent years, various scholars have sought to account for the effects of inter-
national linkage on regime survival. These studies, however, have tended to 
deal only with a truncated sample of international linkages and have lacked a 
systematic analysis of linkage over time and across regions. We have made 
several significant contributions to our understanding of the nature of interna-
tional linkages and their effects on regime survival. We have shown the impor-
tance of viewing autocratic linkage as a distinct form of cross-border 
relationship that has varied over time independently of democratic linkages. 
Although autocratic linkages have been slow to develop, in recent years they 
have been growing at a greater rate than democratic linkages. We have also 
shown that autocratic linkages are crucial in explaining patterns of autocratic 
survival in recent decades. Authoritarian regimes that have higher autocratic 
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linkages are likely to survive longer, and the stronger the linkages, the greater 
the effect. We have demonstrated this effect empirically through a robust 
quantitative analysis of global patterns of international linkages over several 
decades, and have thus offered one of the first statistical tests of linkage-based 
theories of regime survival. An analysis of Saudi policies in the wake of the 
Arab Spring provides further evidence of the importance of international link-
age in shaping patterns of external support for authoritarian regime survival.
Our findings have important implications for the future prospects of 
democracy. As discussed above, we have witnessed a surge in autocratic link-
ages since 2000 that shows no sign of abating. Autocratic regimes are increas-
ing their trade, migration flows, and diplomatic exchange with other 
autocracies even as the total number of democracies in the world declines. As 
these ties make autocratic breakdown less likely, we should expect the 
world’s remaining authoritarian regimes to be more resilient to prevailing 
democratizing pressures than those of the recent past. This is a sobering find-
ing for those who have an interest in the further spread of democracy. The 
tightening of relations between autocratic states poses significant challenges 
to would-be democratic reformers, and as the rise in levels of autocratic link-
age is ongoing, the future holds out little prospect for radical democratic 
transformation in much of the world. As long as autocratic linkages remain 
firm, autocratic rulers will be difficult to dislodge.
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Notes
1. For a more detailed discussion of the characteristics of the linkage indicators, 
please refer to the online appendix, codebook, and replication code available 
from http://cps.sagepub.com/supplemental
1250 Comparative Political Studies 50(9) 
2. Following from hazard ratios of HR Autocratic Trade = exp(bAutocratic Trade) = exp(–
1.994) = 0.136, HR Autocratic Migration = exp(bAutocratic Migration) = exp(–0.272)= 0.762, 
HR Autocratic Diplomatic = exp(bAutocratic Diplomatic) = exp(–0.499) = 0.607, and HR 
Autocratic Distance = exp(–bDistance, Model 1) = exp(–0.185) = 0.831, computed from the 
first three models in Table 1.
3. Following Brownlee, Masoud, and Reynolds (2015), we treat Libya as a case of 
foreign induced regime change (FIRC).
4. Numbers of Saudi migrants in Arab Spring states are generally lower and do not 
show significant differences across the two groups.
5. Qadhafi had called Abdallah a U.S. slave in the context of the 2003 invasion of 
Iraq and a liar at the 2009 summit of the Arab League in Doha.
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